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Abstract 6 
Governments often use voluntary agreements to encourage landholders to adopt environmental 7 
practices, such as excluding stock from grazing riverbanks. In Victoria, Australia, government 8 
agencies subsidize the adoption of these projects, while landholders are required to continue 9 
maintaining stock exclusion indefinitely. In the absence of further financial or legal enforcement, 10 
landholder compliance depends on the motivation and decision-making of individual 11 
landholders. Social beliefs about the responsibility of landholders to improve the condition of 12 
degraded riverine ecosystems, known as social norms, influence farmers to adopt new 13 
environmental practices. The influence of social norms on behaviour weakens when people 14 
perceived themselves to be constrained. From late 1996 to mid-2010 landholders in Victoria 15 
endured more than ten years of drought that has reduced productivity, and income. Drought 16 
conditions may influence whether landholders continue to exclude stock over the long-term, 17 
despite holding positive social norms. However, behaviour is influenced by perceptions of 18 
constraint; landholder perceptions may not reflect drought severity. Perceived drought 19 
affectedness may also be related to the amount of income obtained from farm activities. This 20 
study examined the relationship between social factors, (including injunctive and descriptive 21 
social norms, and symbolic and instrumental social beliefs, perceived drought affectedness, 22 
actual drought severity), and the percentage of overall income that landholders obtain from farm 23 
activities. A social survey, and assessment of river restoration projects, was conducted with 93 24 
landholders in rural Victoria, Australia. We found that landholders who continue to graze 25 
riverbanks hold weaker social norms about excluding stock in drought conditions. Grazing 26 
behaviour was explained by social norms, and perceived drought affectedness together. 27 
Perceived drought affectedness was best explained by actual drought severity, but also by the 28 
amount of income obtained from farming activities, rather than either factor alone. Policy makers 29 
should consider using drought relief funding to subsidize the purchase of additional stock feed 30 
during droughts to encourage farmers to continue environmental stock exclusion, particularly 31 
when farmers rely on farm activities for most of their income. 32 
1. Introduction 33 
Efforts to improve environmental management in river basins often involve projects with rural 34 
landholders One of the most common projects in Australia (Brooks & Lake, 2007) and the 35 
United States of America (Kondolf et al., 2007) involves establishing voluntary agreements with 36 
landholders to exclude stock from grazing riverbanks in order to promote ecological recovery. In 37 
Victoria, Australia, government agencies subsidize the cost of adopting environmental 38 
behaviours for stock exclusion, such as constructing riverbank fencing, while landholders are 39 
legally responsible for continuing to exclude stock from the fenced riverbank (Department of 40 
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Sustainability and Environment, 2011). To be successful, stock exclusion behaviours must be 41 
maintained indefinitely (Moore & Rutherfurd, 2017). Ideally, compliance should be monitored 42 
and enforced (Gunningham, 2003). However, in practice, stock exclusion projects are rarely 43 
assessed, and, to our knowledge, non-compliance has never been penalized. In the absence of 44 
legal repercussions, the long-term success of these projects depends on the motivation of 45 
individual landholders.  46 
An underlying assumption of using voluntary agreements is that landholders are 47 
motivated by non-monetary incentives (Danne, 2003), such as beliefs about social pressure to 48 
behave or not behave in a certain way, known as social norms (Armitage & Conner, 2001). 49 
Numerous studies suggest that environmental social norms influence landholders to adopt 50 
environmental behaviours, including stock exclusion (e.g., Greiner & Gregg, 2011; Wauters et 51 
al., 2010). However, no research has explored whether environmental social norms also motivate 52 
landholders to continue to maintain environmental projects (in this case, stock exclusion) over 53 
the long-term.  54 
Stock exclusion involves different activities and costs for adoption and maintenance. 55 
Thus, landholders may be influenced by different motivations and barriers to adopt a project, as  56 
compared to maintaining a project (Moore & Boldero, 2017). Establishing stock exclusion is 57 
subsidized, however, maintenance involves costs associated with growing or purchasing 58 
additional feed for stock to compensate for lost fodder after the exclusion of stock from grazing 59 
riverbanks.  Riverbanks can produce up to 25% more fodder for stock than pastures (Aarons et 60 
al., 2013). Furthermore, the cost of maintaining stock exclusion is exacerbated during droughts. 61 
Reduced pasture growth, and, thus farm incomes, simultaneously increases the need to purchase 62 
stock feed, and reduces the financial capacity to do so. Perceived constraints, such as cost or 63 
financial loss, can reduce the influence of social norms on behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Between 64 
1997 and 2010 (Steffen, 2015) landholders in Victoria experienced one of the most persistent 65 
and severe droughts in the period of European occupation (known as the Millennium Drought), 66 
resulting in reduced agricultural production and increased debt (Horridge et al., 2005; Mpelasoka 67 
et al., 2008). Thus, while environmental social norms may motivate landholders to adopt stock 68 
exclusion behaviour, the costs associated with purchasing stock feed, particularly in the context 69 
of the Millennium Drought and continuing financial hardship, may reduce the influence of social 70 
norms on the maintenance of stock exclusion.  71 
 This study investigated the relationship between the continued maintenance of stock 72 
exclusion behaviour, environmental social norms, and drought, in three regions of Victoria, 73 
Australia. The purpose of the research was two-fold. First, we explored whether social norms 74 
influence the maintenance of stock exclusion, and therefore the effectiveness of using voluntary 75 
agreements for river restoration projects that involve landholders. Second, we examined the 76 
relationship between drought and landholder behaviour.  77 
 78 
 79 
Social rural research about the relationship between agricultural environmental behaviour and 80 
social beliefs often uses very broad measures of social beliefs (e.g.,Greiner & Gregg, 2011), 81 
rather than measures of specific cognitive constructs, such as different types of social norms 82 
(Burton, 2004). Behavioural research makes several distinctions between types of social norms 83 
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that have important implications for the design of interventions to promote environmental 84 
behaviour in rural communities. For example, Cialdini et al. (1990) distinguish between social 85 
norms about how an individual believes they ‘ought’ to behave, known as injunctive norms, and 86 
social norms about how an individual believes significant others ‘actually’ behave, known as 87 
descriptive norms. This distinction is important because each type of norm has distinctly 88 
different conceptual and motivational foundations (Cialdini, 2007). Injunctive norms are 89 
“concerned with perceived social pressure, that is, the person’s potential to gain approval or 90 
suffer sanctions from significant others for engaging in a behaviour” (Rivis & Sheeran, 2003, p. 91 
219). Descriptive norms are beliefs about the prevalence of behaviour and, thus, are influenced 92 
by information about how important others actually behave (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005).  93 
Interventions can promote either descriptive or injunctive norms to encourage pro-94 
environmental beahviour (Biel & Thøgersen, 2007; Cialdini, 2007; Göckeritz et al., 2010). With 95 
one exception (Minato, Curtis, & Allan, 2010), rural research does not distinguish between 96 
injunctive and descriptive norms (e.g., Fielding et al., 2008). Minato et al. (2010) analysed 97 
landholder responses to open-ended survey questions and identified injunctive and descriptive 98 
social norms, rather than using direct measures of these constructs. Thus, we examine the 99 
relationship between stock exclusion and both injunctive and descriptive social norms. 100 
Further, people can simultaneously hold multiple, often conflicting, social beliefs about a 101 
single action or object. A common distinction is made between symbolic and instrumental beliefs 102 
(e.g., Cary, 1993; Crandle et al., 1997; Lievens, 2007). Symbolic beliefs reflect long-standing 103 
ideology, and tend to be unaffected by self-interest, while instrumental beliefs are, “founded on 104 
the real-world consequences of actions.” (Crandle et al., 1997, p.96). Thus, social norms may 105 
vary depending on the context of the belief object or activity, and whether the context pertains to 106 
ideology or self-interest. For example, instrumental beliefs about contagion have more influence 107 
on the activity, ‘keeping social distance from persons with HIV/AIDS’, than symbolic beliefs 108 
about the association of HIV/AIDS with drug use and homosexuality (Crandle et al., 1997). 109 
Thus, an individual could hold positive injunctive norms towards homosexuality, and yet choose 110 
to keep social distance from persons with HIV/AIDS on the basis of negative beliefs about 111 
contagion.  112 
Similarly, Cary (1993) found  that landholders can simultaneously hold two types of 113 
beliefs about how they ‘ought’ to behave in relation to environmental projects. Positive beliefs 114 
about the importance of environmental behaviour tend to be symbolic in nature; symbolic beliefs 115 
may contribute meaningfully to social ideology but do not necessarily result in the performance 116 
of environmental behaviour. Rather, the performance of environmental behaviour is influenced 117 
to a greater degree by beliefs about the practical value of the behaviour, such as the impact that 118 
performing the behaviour will have on farm businesses. These instrumental beliefs may conflict 119 
with symbolic beliefs held about the same behaviour (e.g., Crandall et al., 1997).  For example, 120 
landholders may believe that ideally they ‘ought’ to maintain stock exclusion, while 121 
simultaneously believing that in reality they ‘ought not’ to maintain stock exclusion if there are 122 
negative repercussion for their farm business. Thus, the strength of injunctive social norms may 123 
vary depending on the context of the activity, in this instance, whether performing environmental 124 
behaviour has a negative impact on farm businesses.  125 
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The fact that people can hold multiple conflicting beliefs about a single behaviour 126 
suggests that specifying the context of an activity or object is important for accurately measuring 127 
social norms. Thus, we examined the relationship between landholder environmental behaviour, 128 
and two different types of injunctive social norms: injunctive social norms about symbolic 129 
beliefs, and injunctive social norms about instrumental beliefs. We chose to distinguish between 130 
symbolic and injunctive beliefs by constructing social norm measures that stipulate two 131 
conflicting scenarios: (1) ideal scenarios that present no negative repercussions for farm 132 
businesses; and (2) less than ideal scenarios that present negative repercussions for farm 133 
businesses. The scenarios were related to the presence or absence of drought conditions. 134 
Following Cary (1993), we anticipated that injunctive norms about maintaining stock exclusion 135 
in scenarios of good water availability and high farm productivity would be symbolic in nature, 136 
and thus not related to whether landholders maintain stock exclusion. In contrast, we expected 137 
that injunctive norms about maintaining stock exclusion in scenarios of drought and low farm 138 
productivity would be instrumental in nature, and thus related to whether landholders maintain 139 
stock exclusion.  140 
The second purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between drought and the 141 
maintenance of stock exclusion projects. Drought conditions can prevent landholders from 142 
adopting environmental practices (Curtis et al., 2008). Ajzen (1991) argued that perceived 143 
behavioural control (PBC) lessen the influence of social norms on the performance of behaviour. 144 
We did not measure PBC, however, in principle Ajzen (1991) suggests that perceptions of 145 
constraint can weaken the influence of social norms on behaivour. Importantly, landholder 146 
perceptions about the impact of drought on their farm businesses do not necessarily reflect the 147 
actual climatic severity of drought conditions. For example, Lukasiewicz et al (2012) found that 148 
landholder beliefs about climate change are based on local experiences rather than a scientific 149 
understanding of climatic conditions. Along with actual climatic conditions, perceptions of 150 
drought affectedness may also be influenced by how heavily landholders rely on farm businesses 151 
for their financial security. Nelson et al. (2005) found that landholders who have multiple 152 
sources of income tend to be more resilient to external stressors, such as climatic events, 153 
compared to those with only a single source of income. Similarly, Kebede (1992) found that 154 
landholders with incomes from both agricultural activities and off-farm activities were more 155 
likely to adopt environmental behaviour. Riparian areas produce significantly greater amounts of 156 
fodder than pastures, and preventing cattle from grazing can result in financial losses, both in 157 
terms of the additional cost of purchasing extra fodder, and in terms of needing to allocate 158 
additional pasture to fodder, that would otherwise be used for commercial production (Aarons et 159 
al., 2013). In times of drought and low farm productivity, landholders who obtain a higher 160 
percentage of their overall income from off-farm employment may be more capable of 161 
purchasing feed, and, as a result, more likely to maintain stock exclusion from the river frontage. 162 
Therefore, drought severity and the amount of income obtained from farm activities may 163 
influence perceptions of drought affectedness, and in turn whether landholders maintain stock 164 
exclusion.  165 
Drought relief funding for stock management is available for landholders on the basis of 166 
drought severity; the Victorian Government uses climate data obtained from the Bureau of 167 
Meteorology to make decisions about the eligibility of landholders for financial aid (Victoria 168 
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State Government, 2017). Drought relief packages could be used to encourage landholders to 169 
continue stock exclusion during drought events. However, the effectiveness of this approach 170 
depends on whether landholders’ perceptions reflect actual drought severity. Thus, our study 171 
examined the relationship between drought perception and the maintenance of stock exclusion 172 
behaviour, and the relationship between perceived drought affectedness, actual drought severity, 173 
and the amount of overall income that landholders obtain from farm activities.  174 
This research was conducted with landholders from three regional authorities in Victoria, 175 
known as Catchment Management Authorities (CMAs). The study makes three contributions to 176 
rural studies, research about environmental behaviour, and environmental policy in agricultural 177 
communities. Firstly, rural research about environmental behaviour often examines broad social 178 
factors rather than specific cognitive constructs (Burton, 2004). However, understanding the 179 
precise nature of social beliefs is important for designing effective interventions (Cialdini, 2003, 180 
2007). Thus, we distinguish between injunctive social norms about how landholders believe they 181 
‘ought’ to behave, and descriptive social norms about how landholders perceive others ‘actually’ 182 
behave. Secondly, farmers may hold multiple, conflicting beliefs about performing 183 
environmental behaviour (Cary, 1993). Thus, we also distinguish between two types of 184 
injunctive social norms: symbolic social norms about how landholders believe they should 185 
behave in ideal scenarios, and instrumental social norms about how landholders believe they 186 
should behave in less than ideal scenarios that have negative repercussions for farm businesses. 187 
The third contribution of this research is about the relationship between perceived drought 188 
affectedness, actual drought severity and the amount of income that landholders obtain from 189 
farm activities.  190 
 191 
2. Hypotheses and research questions 192 
 193 
2.1. Injunctive norms 194 
 195 
Cary (1993) suggested that while landholders can hold conflicting symbolic and instrumental 196 
beliefs about an issue or activity, their behaviour is more consistent with their instrumental 197 
beliefs about the practical value of performing an activity. We assessed two types of injunctive 198 
norms; social norms about symbolic beliefs, and social norms about instrumental beliefs. 199 
Specifically, we assessed injunctive social norms reflecting symbolic beliefs that landholders 200 
should exclude stock from riverbanks in scenarios of good water availability and high farm 201 
productivity. We also assessed injunctive social norms reflecting instrumental beliefs that 202 
landholders should exclude stock from riverbanks in scenarios of drought and low farm 203 
productivity. We expected that there would be no relationship between symbolic norms and 204 
stock grazing, and, thus, that there would be no difference between landholders that graze and 205 
landholders who do not graze for norms about excluding stock in years of good water availability 206 
(H1) and years of high farm productivity (H2).  207 
 Research suggests that drought, resulting in low farm productivity, and financial 208 
insecurity, are barriers to the adoption of environmental behaviour in agricultural communities 209 
(e.g., Curtis et al., 2008). Thus, we expected that landholders who continue to graze the 210 
riverbank would report weaker instrumental norms about excluding stock in years of drought 211 
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(H3) and in years of low farm productivity (H4), compared to landholders who do not graze. In 212 
addition, both social norms and perceptions of barriers, such as financial insecurity, can 213 
influence behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Thus, we expected that the injunctive social norm about 214 
excluding stock in drought conditions, and perceived drought affectedness would explain greater 215 
variance in whether or not landholders continue to graze the riverbank than the social norm alone 216 
(H5). 217 
 218 
2.2. Drought affectedness, drought severity, and income 219 
 220 
Drought conditions negatively impact farm businesses (Mpelasoka et al., 2008). We anticipated 221 
that landholders who graze the riverbank would report higher drought affectedness than those 222 
who exclude stock from the riverbank (H6). Furthermore, perceived drought affectedness may be 223 
influenced by actual climatic conditions, as well as the degree that landholders rely on 224 
agricultural activities for income. Accordingly, we predicted that there would be a positive 225 
relationship between actual drought severity and perceived drought affectedness (H7), and the 226 
percentage of overall income obtained from farm activities and perceived drought affectedness 227 
(H8). We also examined the relationship between perceived drought affectedness and drought 228 
severity at the regional scale. A preliminary examination of climate data indicated that during the 229 
Millennium Drought, landholders in CMA C experienced greater drought severity compared to 230 
landholders in CMA A and CMA B. Thus, we expected that landholders in CMA C would report 231 
higher drought affectedness than those in CMA A and CMA B (H9). We also expected that, 232 
together, drought severity and the percentage of overall income obtained from farm activities, 233 
would predict greater variance in perceived drought affectedness than either variable individually 234 
(H10). 235 
 236 
2.3. Descriptive social norms 237 
 238 
In addition to the above hypotheses, we anticipated that landholders would report that ‘others 239 
like them’ behave in a similar way to themselves (Goldstein et al., 2008). For example, we 240 
expected that landholders who report they graze frequently, would also report that ‘others like 241 
them’ graze frequently.   242 
 243 
------------------------------------Table 1 about here---------------------------------------------------------- 244 
 245 
3. Methods 246 
3.1. Research design and sampling 247 
The current research involved three methods of data collection. Firstly, data about evidence of 248 
stock exclusion or continued grazing on riverbanks was collected CMA staff during monitoring 249 
and assessment projects conducted between 2013 and 2014 in three regions of Victoria referred 250 
to here as CMA A, CMA B, and CMA C. In total 231 assessments were conducted at landholder 251 
properties in CAM A (N = 137), CMA B (N = 50), and CMA C (N = 44). These landholders 252 
were involved in projects funded by CMAs to fence riverbanks to exclude stock from gazing the 253 
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riparian area. The assessment projects were funded by the Victorian State Government. 254 
Secondly, data about social norms, perceived drought affectedness, and the amount of income 255 
landholders obtain from farm activities were collected using a social survey that was distributed 256 
by mail to the 231 landholders involved in CMA assessments. In total, 93 landholders (40% 257 
return rate) completed and returned usable surveys. A small number of landholders completed 258 
the survey by phone due to mail delays in regional Victoria. Finally, data about drought severity 259 
was obtained from the Bureau of Meteorology. This research was approved by a Behavioural 260 
Sciences Human Research Ethics board.  261 
3.2. Measures of behaviour, social norms, drought, and income  262 
 263 
Stock exclusion behaviour was measured by CMA staff during visual inspections of landholder 264 
properties. Evidence of continued stock grazing on the riverbank included hoof marks, eaten 265 
vegetation, and the presence of cows. Evidence of grazing was coded as ‘1’. An absence of 266 
evidence of grazing, meaning total exclusion, was coded as ‘2’. 267 
Injunctive social norms about stock exclusion were assessed with four 7-point Likert scale items 268 
that were included on the social survey. Our study is the first to develop social norm measures 269 
for stock exclusion behaviour. Draft social surveys were reviewed by ten landholders and six 270 
CMA staff. During interviews these participants suggested that other landholders may be 271 
unlikely to respond to injunctive norm survey items structured in the traditional format (Ajzen, 272 
2017), which is: ‘how do others think you should behave’. It was proposed that farmers might 273 
respond negatively, or choose not to respond, to direct statements that suggest other people’s 274 
expectations should influence their behaviour. This is consistent with the results of a survey of 275 
794 landholders in Victoria conducted by Curtis et al. (2008). Their survey included two 276 
personal norm items and one injunctive social norm item. While most landholders who 277 
completed their survey responded to the personal norm items, 52% of participants either did not 278 
respond to the injunctive norm item or responded ‘N/A’. Following discussions with the 279 
landholders who reviewed our draft survey, we developed an alternative measure of injunctive 280 
norms. Our item structure was ‘landholders should’ rather than ‘other people think landholders 281 
should’. Thus, while non-conventional, our items do capture beliefs about how landholders think 282 
they ‘ought’ to behave, which is the foundation of injunctive social norms (Cialdini et al., 1990).   283 
 The injunctive social norm survey items, summarized in Table 2, were also designed to 284 
reduce the likelihood of a common respondent bias associated with social research (e.g., Choi & 285 
Pak, 2005), including environmental behaviour (e.g., Hirsch, 2010), referred to as ‘acquiescence 286 
bias’. Acquiescence bias is the tendency of survey respondents to agree with most statements 287 
(Van Sonderen et al., 2013). This phenomenon is often attributed to the perceived social 288 
desirability of agreeing with statements on questionnaires rather than disagreeing with statements 289 
(Choi & Pak, 2005), and perceptions of the researcher's expectations about how study 290 
participants should respond to survey items (Fuji et al., 1985). The participants who reviewed the 291 
draft survey suggested that most landholders are familiar with the expectations of CMA staff, 292 
and thus, would agree with statements about excluding stock from grazing in ideal scenarios 293 
related to good water availability and high farm productivity. By comparison, there is an 294 
understanding that drought events warrant deviation from ordinary farming practices (e.g., Curtis 295 
et al., 2008). Thus, it was anticipated that landholders were more likely to respond honestly to 296 
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statements about less than ideal scenarios related to drought and low farm productivity, 297 
compared to statements about ideal scenarios. Therefore, the symbolic social norm survey items 298 
were revised to reduce the likelihood of acquiescence bias. 299 
One common approach to counter acquiescence bias is to reverse the wording of 300 
questionnaire items to change the direction of the statement from positive to negative (e.g., 301 
Qasem & Gul, 2014; Solís Salazar, 2015). For example, prior to revising the survey in response 302 
to landholder and CMA feedback, the symbolic social norm survey items were structured in a 303 
positive direction: ‘Landholders should be prepared to exclude stock from the fenced frontage in 304 
years of good water availability’. Landholders may perceive that the leading term ‘should’ 305 
reflects the beliefs of CMA staff; that landholders should exclude stock in ideal conditions. Thus, 306 
one option to overcome acquiescence bias was to structure symbolic social norm survey items 307 
negatively, as follows: ‘Landholders should not be prepared to exclude stock from the fenced 308 
frontage in years of good water availability. However, using negatively structured items is 309 
controversial, and is widely considered to be ineffective (e.g., Qasem & Gul, 2014). For 310 
example, Van Sonderen et al. (2013) argue that negatively structured survey items can confuse 311 
respondents and result in contaminated data. Thus, rather than reversing the wording of symbolic 312 
norm survey items, we chose to reverse the implications of agreeing with statements to prompt 313 
respondents to pay closer attention (Solís Salazar, 2015).  314 
The revised symbolic norm survey items were structured to encourage landholders with 315 
strong symbolic social norms to disagree, rather than agree with the survey items. The items 316 
were structured as follows: ‘Landholders should be prepared to exclude stock from the fenced 317 
frontage only in years of good water availability’. Disagreement with the statement, rather than 318 
agreement, implies the symbolic belief that landholders should exclude stock from the fenced 319 
frontage in all scenarios, rather than only in favorable scenarios. Thus, it was expected that 320 
landholders who hold strong symbolic beliefs would disagree with the symbolic social norm 321 
survey items, while landholders who hold weak symbolic beliefs would agree with the survey 322 
items. 323 
 324 
-------------------------------------Table 2 about here--------------------------------------------------------- 325 
 326 
Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with each item using a 1 (“strongly 327 
disagree” to 7 (“strongly agree”) response scale, where 4 indicates “neither agree nor disagree”. 328 
Two items assessed the symbolic beliefs that landholders should be prepared to exclude stock 329 
from grazing the riverbank in years of good water availability, and in years of high farm 330 
productivity. Two items assessed the instrumental beliefs that landholders should exclude stock 331 
from gazing the riverbank in years of drought, and in years of low farm productivity.  332 
 Descriptive social norms were assessed by comparing how an individual behaves with 333 
their beliefs about how other people behave (Cialdini, 2007). Descriptive norm survey items 334 
were also altered following feedback. All of the ten landholders who reviewed our draft survey 335 
indicated that farmers would not be able to answer questions about ‘how other farmers in your 336 
area behave’ because of the regional variability of farming enterprise. Therefore, the items were 337 
revised to ask about ‘how other farmers like you behave (e.g., if you are a cattle grazer, other 338 
cattle grazers in your region)’. Our social survey included items asking landholders to self-report 339 
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about their own grazing behaviour, and items asking landholders to estimate how other 340 
landholders ‘like them’ behave. Items included asking landholders to describe the duration, 341 
regularity, and seasonality of their own grazing regimes and of other landholders’ grazing 342 
regimes. We intended to examine whether landholders’ descriptive norms reflected their own 343 
behaviour.  344 
 Drought affectedness and the amount of income obtained from farm activities were 345 
assessed using one 7-point Likert scale survey item and two open-ended survey items. The Likert 346 
scale item assessed participants’ perception of their drought affectedness in terms of the impact 347 
of drought on their farm business. Participants indicated the extent of their perceived drought 348 
affectedness using a 1 (“not at all affected”) to 7 (“extremely affected”) response scale. Two 349 
open-ended items asked participants to report the percentage of overall income obtained from 350 
farming activities, and to list the main ways that drought affected their farm business.  351 
 Drought severity was determined using gridded daily precipitation data from the Bureau 352 
of Meteorology’s Australian Water Availability Project (AWAP) dataset (Jones, Wang, & 353 
Fawcett, 2009). For each farm property, daily precipitation was extracted from an AWAP grid 354 
cell (0.05° x 0.05°, approximately 5km x 5km) representative of the farm’s latitude and longitude 355 
for the period 1900-2016. The daily values were summed to calendar year values. Drought 356 
severity was computed by dividing the average precipitation value for the drought years (1997-357 
2010) by the average value for the entire period on record (1900-2016), to produce a ratio 358 
representing drought severity for each farm property. The coefficient of variance for the years 359 
1900-2016 was also calculated for each site. The drought severity ratio indicates the extent that 360 
the average precipitation during the Millennium Drought deviated from the average precipitation 361 
of the year 1990-2016 for each landholder property. Drought severity ratio values range from 0 362 
to 1; high values indicate no deviation and low values indicate high deviation. A high drought 363 
severity ratio, such as 0.9, might suggest an area has experienced only minimal reduced 364 
precipitation during the drought. However, a low coefficient of variability, such as 0.1, indicates 365 
that even a slight deviation from the average precipitation is likely to be climatically significant.  366 
 367 
3.3. Data analysis  368 
 369 
Our research involved both qualitative and quantitative data. Therefore multiple methods of data 370 
analysis were used, including statistical analysis and thematic content analysis.  371 
 372 
 Statistical analysis. Hypotheses 1 to 4 about the relationship between injunctive norms 373 
and stock grazing were examined using t-tests. Hypothesis 5 about the amount of variance of 374 
grazing behaviour explained by the social norm for excluding stock in drought conditions, and 375 
perceived drought affectedness, was examined by computing a stepwise multiple regression.  376 
 Hypothesis 6 about the relationship between perceived drought affectedness and stock 377 
grazing was examined using a t-test. Hypotheses 7 about the relationship between perceived 378 
drought affectedness and actual drought severity was addressed by computing a Pearson’s 379 
correlation coefficient. Hypothesis 8 about the relationship between perceived drought 380 
affectedness and the amount of income landholders obtain from farm activities was also 381 
addressed by computing a Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Hypothesis 9 about differences of 382 
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perceived drought affectedness between CMA A, CMA B, and CMA C was addressed by 383 
computing a one-way ANOVA. Finally, a stepwise multiple regression was used to examine 384 
Hypothesis 10 about the amount of variance of perceived drought affectedness explained by 385 
drought severity and income together.  386 
 387 
 Thematic analysis of open-ended survey responses. Responses to open-ended survey 388 
items about descriptive norms and the ways that drought as impacted farm businesses were 389 
thematically analysed and coded. Common themes were determined by identifying objects and 390 
categories in respondent data (H. Jansen, 2010), and recording the frequency of mentions 391 
(Castro, Kellison, Boyd, & Kopak, 2010).  392 
 393 
4. Results 394 
 395 
4.1 Descriptive results 396 
 397 
Stock exclusion. CMA data about evidence of grazing indicated that of the 93 landholders 398 
who completed the social survey, 53 (57%) grazed in the fenced frontage, whereas 40 (43%) did 399 
not. 400 
 401 
 Injunctive norms. Table 3 displays the means, standard deviations, and correlations for 402 
landholder responses to injunctive norm survey items. There was a strong positive correlation 403 
between the symbolic beliefs about excluding stock from grazing in the ideal scenario of good 404 
water availability and beliefs about excluding stock in the ideal scenario of high farm 405 
productivity. There was also a strong positive correlation between the instrumental beliefs about 406 
the responsibility of landholders to exclude stock in times of drought, and the instrumental 407 
beliefs about excluding stock in times of low farm productivity. There was no relationship 408 
between symbolic beliefs and instrumental beliefs.  409 
 410 
-----------------------------------------Table 3 about here----------------------------------------------------- 411 
 412 
 Descriptive social norms. It was anticipated that landholders would estimate what ‘other 413 
people like them’ do in relation to stock grazing, and that these estimations would reflect their 414 
own behaviour (Goldstein et al., 2008). However, 65% of responses to the descriptive norm 415 
items were ‘NA’ or ‘I don’t know’. Only 15% of responses estimated what other landholders do 416 
and, of these, only 7% gave responses that were consistent with their own behaviour.  417 
Responses also included more than 100 comments that suggest the participants do not 418 
hold strong descriptive norms about grazing behaviour. Three themes emerged from the thematic 419 
analysis of these comments. Firstly, 24% of comments indicated that stock exclusion is not 420 
normative behaviour, rather landholders perceive their involvement in exclusion projects as the 421 
behaviour of a minority. For example, comments included “Most don’t fence the river”, and “the 422 
neighbours think we’re mad for fencing off grazing land”.   423 
Secondly, 33% of comments indicated that landholders are unable to estimate others’ 424 
behaviour because they lack the appropriate knowledge, and that lack of knowledge is at least in 425 
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part related to the geographical isolation of stock farmers, from others ‘like them’. Comments 426 
included “I don’t know what other farmers do, silly question!”, and “no other dairy farmers in 427 
our area”. Thirdly, 43% of comments indicated that others’ behaviour is highly contextual, and 428 
thus cannot be estimated. For example, in response to an item about the percentage of other 429 
landholders that graze the fenced frontage, one participant commented that “Some would, some 430 
wouldn’t, everyone is different”. 431 
 432 
Perceived drought affectedness and farm income. Table 4 displays the means and 433 
standard deviations for landholder responses to survey items about drought affectedness and 434 
farm income. Farm businesses are moderately affected by drought conditions. On average, 435 
farmers obtain 50% of income from farm activities, although the standard deviation indicates 436 
considerable variability. 437 
 438 
-------------------------------------------Table 4 about here--------------------------------------------------- 439 
 440 
Table 5 demonstrates that there was no difference for percentage income from on-farm activities 441 
between landholders in CMA A (M = 58.85, SD = 40.59), CMA B (M = 53.43, SD = 42.63), and 442 
CMA C (M = 38.20, SD = 39.67), F (2, 84) = 1.91, p = .15.   443 
 444 
-------------------------------------------Table 5 about here--------------------------------------------------- 445 
 446 
Responses to the open-ended survey item about the ways that drought has impacted farm 447 
businesses were analysed and coded. In total, 81 landholders responded to the open-ended survey 448 
item about the ways that drought has impacted their farm businesses. Common themes included 449 
the psychological impact of drought on farming communities, the ecological impact of drought 450 
on riverbank vegetation, and the impact of drought on water availability, stock management, and 451 
financial security.  452 
The most common impacts were related to financial security (N = 42), such as reduced 453 
income and increasing debt, and stock management (N = 39), such as shortage of fodder and 454 
being forced to destock. Two landholders reported spending between $200, 000 and $500, 000 455 
on additional feed. One landholder reported depleting his retirement funds to subsidize the cost 456 
of additional feed. Further, landholders who continue to graze mentioned these themes more 457 
frequently than landholders who exclude stock from grazing. The impact of drought on financial 458 
security was mentioned by 50% of landholders who continue to graze, and 40% of landholders 459 
who exclude stock from grazing. The impact of drought on stock management was also 460 
mentioned by 50% of landholders who continue to graze, and 35% of landholders who exclude 461 
stock.  462 
 463 
 Drought severity. On average, the drought severity ratio for the study sites was high (M = 464 
.86, SD = .02), however, the coefficient of variance was low (M = .26, SD = .04). Thus, the ratio 465 
indicates a significant deviation of rainfall from the average. ANOVA analysis revealed that 466 
there was a significant difference for both drought severity, and variance between the three 467 
regions. CMA C (M = .84, SD = .02) experienced higher drought severity than CMA A (M = .99, 468 
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SD = .01) and CMA B (M = .86, SD = .02). CMA C (M = .23, SD = .04) also experienced higher 469 
variance of rainfall than CMA A (M = .29, SD = .02) and CMA B (M = .25, SD = .02). Table 5 470 
presents the ANOVA analysis for difference of drought severity ratio and coefficient of variance 471 
between the three CMAs. 472 
  473 
4.2. Relationships between injunctive norms, stock grazing, and drought affectedness 474 
 475 
The t-test results for hypotheses 1 to 4 are reported in Table 6. Overall, our predictions about the 476 
distinction between symbolic and instrumental social norms were supported. Hypothesis 1 was 477 
supported as there was no difference between landholders who graze and those who do not graze, 478 
for the symbolic social norm about excluding stock from grazing in the scenario of good water 479 
availability. Hypothesis 2 was also supported, as there was no difference between landholders 480 
who graze, and landholders who exclude stock from grazing, for the symbolic social norm about 481 
excluding stock from grazing in the scenario of high farm productivity.  482 
Hypothesis 3 was supported as landholders who graze reported weaker instrumental 483 
norms about excluding stock from grazing in drought conditions than landholders who exclude 484 
stock. Hypothesis 4 was also supported as landholders who graze reported weaker instrumental 485 
social norms about excluding stock from grazing in the scenario of low farm productivity, 486 
compared to landholders who exclude stock.  487 
 488 
--------------------------------------------Table 6 about here-------------------------------------------------- 489 
 490 
    A stepwise multiple regression analysis revealed that together the instrumental injunctive 491 
norm about drought conditions and perceived drought affectedness accounted for 15.2% of the 492 
variance in grazing behaviour (p = .001). The R2 change value and F-statistic were calculated to 493 
determine whether the addition of drought affectedness (Model 2 in Table 7 below) significantly 494 
improved the prediction of grazing behavior, compared to the injunctive norm independently 495 
(Model 1 in Table 7 below). Hypothesis 5 was supported as the addition of drought affectedness 496 
significantly improved prediction (R2 change = .05, F = 5.00, p = .03). The standardized 497 
coefficient (B), standardized error (SE), and unstandardized coefficient (β) of the regression 498 
analysis are presented in Table 7.  499 
 500 
-------------------------------------------Table 7 about here--------------------------------------------------- 501 
 502 
 503 
4.3. Relationships between drought affectedness, drought severity, income, and stock grazing 504 
 505 
The results of the t-test computed to examine hypothesis 6 are reported in Table 6. Hypothesis 6 506 
was supported, as landholders who graze reported higher perceived drought affectedness than 507 
landholders who exclude stock. Hypothesis 7 was partially supported as there was a weak 508 
positive relationship between landholder perceptions of drought affectedness and actual drought 509 
severity, r(82) = .50, p<.00. Hypothesis 8 was supported as there was a weak positive correlation 510 
between landholder perceptions of drought affectedness and the percentage of overall income 511 
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that landholders obtain from farming activities, r(85) = .45, p<.01. In contrast to our 512 
expectations, landholders from CMA A (M = 6.07, SD = 1.53) reported higher perceived drought 513 
affectedness than landholders from CMA B (M = 5.55, SD = 1.50) and CMA C (M = 3.81, SD = 514 
2.34), F (2, 87) = 12.61, p = .00. However, there was no difference between CMA A and CMA 515 
B; t(57) = 1.30, p = 0.20. Thus, Hypothesis 9 was not supported; despite the fact that the region 516 
of CMA C experienced the greatest drought severity between the drought years of 1994 to 2010, 517 
landholders in CMA A and CMA B reported higher drought affectedness than landholders in 518 
CMA C.  519 
Finally, while the percentage of income from farm activities and drought severity were 520 
weakly correlated with perceptions of drought affectedness, together these variables explained a 521 
significantly greater amount of variance, compared to either independently. A stepwise multiple 522 
regression analysis revealed that income and drought severity accounted for 30% of the variance 523 
in perceived drought affectedness (p = .00). Independently, income accounted for only 20% of 524 
variance (p = .00), while drought severity only accounted for 15% of variance (p = .00). The R2 525 
change value and F-statistic were calculated to determine whether the addition of drought 526 
severity (Model 2 in Table 8 below) significantly improved the prediction of perceptions, 527 
compared to percentage of income obtained from farm activities, independently (Model 1 in 528 
Table 8 below). Hypothesis 10 was supported as the addition of drought severity significantly 529 
improved prediction (R2 change = .06, F = 6.31, p = .01). The standardized coefficient (B), 530 
standardized error (SE), and unstandardized coefficient (β) of the regression analysis are 531 
presented in Table 8.  532 
 533 
--------------------------------------------Table 8 about here-------------------------------------------------- 534 
 535 
 536 
Figure 1 presents a schematic of the results of the stepwise multiple regression computed 537 
to test Hypothesis 5 about factors that explain whether or not landholders graze, and the results 538 
of the stepwise multiple regression computed to test Hypothesis about the factors that explain 539 
perceived drought affectedness. Together, the instrumental injunctive social norm about drought 540 
conditions and perceived drought affectedness, explain a statistically significantly greater 541 
variance of grazing behaviour than either factor alone. Likewise, together, the percentage of 542 
income obtained from farm activities and drought severity, explain a statistically significantly 543 
greater amount of variance of perceived drought affectedness than either factor alone. 544 
 545 
 546 
 547 
 548 
----------------------------------------Figure 1 about here----------------------------------------------------- 549 
 550 
 551 
5. Discussion 552 
 553 
 
14 
 
An underlying assumption of using voluntary agreements to implement environmental projects 554 
in rural communities, such as stock exclusion, is that landholders are motivated by non-monetary 555 
incentives, including social norms (Danne, 2003). The results of this study suggest that whether 556 
or not landholders maintain environmental behaviour is related to both instrumental social norms 557 
about the responsibility of landholders to exclude stock from grazing the riverbank in drought 558 
conditions, and perceived drought affectedness. Drought reduces farm productivity and increases 559 
the amount of stock feed that landholders must purchase. Landholders who perceive themselves 560 
to be more drought affected are more likely to graze stock on the fenced riverbank. Further, 561 
landholders with a higher proportion of overall income from farm activities perceive themselves 562 
to be more drought affected, and are more likely to graze cattle on the riverbank. Finally, 563 
responses to descriptive norm survey items suggest that landholders believe that participating in 564 
stock exclusion projects sets them apart from most other landholders, rather than reinforce their 565 
social identity.   566 
 567 
5.1. Symbolic and instrumental injunctive social norms, drought and stock exclusion  568 
 569 
Our findings are consistent with Cary (1993) who found that although farmers hold both 570 
symbolic and instrumental social beliefs, their behaviour reflects the pragmatic value of 571 
environmental management for their businesses. Landholders’ behaviour is related to their 572 
instrumental injunctive social norms about the responsibility of farmers to exclude stock from 573 
grazing during times of drought and low farm productivity. As anticipated, there was no 574 
relationship between behaviour and symbolic social norms about grazing in ideal conditions of 575 
good water availability and high farm productivity. In contrast, there was a relationship between 576 
behaviour and instrumental social norms; landholders who continue to graze also hold weaker 577 
instrumental social norms than landholders who exclude stock entirely. 578 
Further, landholders who graze report higher perceived drought affectedness than 579 
landholders who do not graze. Landholders who graze also reported that drought conditions 580 
resulted in reduced pasture for stock fodder and high costs associated with purchasing additional 581 
feed more frequently than landholders who exclude stock entirely, although the difference was 582 
not statistically significant. Importantly, landholders who graze reported higher drought 583 
affectedness and weaker instrumental social norms. These findings support the concept that 584 
behaviour is influenced by social norms and constraining variables (Ajzen, 1985, 1991).  585 
From a policy perspective, landholders who perceive they experience less drought 586 
affectedness may be motivated by injunctive social norms to continue maintaining stock 587 
exclusion behaviours. Landholders who perceive their businesses are more affected by drought 588 
may require additional support to continue excluding stock from riverbanks. In Victoria, drought 589 
relief funding, including funding for stock management, is allocated based on climate data about 590 
the severity of drought conditions. This funding could be used to subsidize the purchase of stock 591 
feed, and thus, encourage landholders to continue excluding stock from riverbanks during 592 
drought conditions when riverine ecosystems are highly vulnerable to stock grazing (Jansen & 593 
Robertson, 2001).  594 
However, perceptions of drought affectedness are related to both actual drought severity, 595 
and the amount of overall income that landholders obtain from farm activities. Between 1994 596 
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and 2010 CMA C experienced greater drought severity than either CMA A or CMA B. However, 597 
landholders in CMA A and CMA B reported higher drought affectedness. On average, 598 
landholders in CMA C obtain 20% less income from farm activities than landholders in CMA A, 599 
and 15% less income than landholders in CMA B. While the difference is not statistically 600 
significant, these observations are consistent with previous findings that on average landholders 601 
in CMA C obtain a high proportion of income from off-farm activities, compared to other 602 
regions in Victoria (e.g., Wilson et al., 2003). Thus, to be effective, agencies that offer drought 603 
relief funding should consider the dynamics of regional employment. Landholders who receive a 604 
larger proportion of their income from farm activities perceive themselves as more drought 605 
affected, and are more likely to continue grazing the fenced frontage, compared to landholders 606 
who receive a smaller portion of their income from farm activities. During drought events 607 
government agencies, could encourage the maintenance of stock exclusion behaviours by 608 
subsidizing stock feed for landholders who rely heavily on farm businesses for income.          609 
Taken together, our findings suggest that landholder behaviour is related to instrumental 610 
injunctive social norms about the responsibility of farmers for environmental management in 611 
drought conditions, as well as perceived drought affectedness. Perceived drought affectedness is 612 
related to both actual drought severity and the amount of income that landholders obtain from 613 
farm activities.  614 
 615 
5.2. Descriptive social norms 616 
 617 
Responses to the seven descriptive norm items were unexpected. We anticipated that landholders 618 
would estimate how others behave and that their responses would be consistent with their own 619 
behaviour. For example, landholders who graze should report that others like them graze more 620 
frequently than landholders who do not graze (Cialdini, 2007). Responses to descriptive norm 621 
items suggest that most landholders were unable to estimate how others like them behave for 622 
three reasons. Firstly, responses suggest that our participants believe that performing 623 
environmental behaviour (whether or not that behaviour is successfully maintained) distinguishes 624 
themselves from most other landholders. Behaviour can be motivated by both the desire for 625 
social acceptance and by the need to confirm self-identity (Conner & Armitage, 1998).  Thus, 626 
landholders who participate in stock exclusion projects may do so to reinforce their own self-627 
identity as environmental stewards, rather than to fulfil social expectations.  628 
Secondly, responses indicate that landholders do not have enough knowledge about how 629 
others behave to form descriptive norms. Landholder properties are often boarded by farms and 630 
farmers that are not ‘like them’; a cattle farmer may have neighbours that farm fruit trees. 631 
Descriptive norms form when people have information about how others behave (Lapinski & 632 
Rimal, 2005). Geographic and social isolation from other farmers involved in similar 633 
environmental behaviours may limit the amount of knowledge landholders have about how other 634 
farmers involved in stock exclusion projects actually behave. 635 
  Thirdly, responses indicated that landholders believe the behaviour of others like them is 636 
highly contextual, and varies between individuals. Our participants suggested that landholders 637 
may behave differently in times of good water availability, compared to times of drought, 638 
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particularly if drought conditions result in shortages of stock feed produced on farm properties. 639 
Thus, landholders do not appear to hold salient descriptive norms about stock exclusion projects.  640 
These results suggest two avenues for environmental policy and improving the outcomes 641 
of voluntary instruments in rural communities. Firstly, educating landholders about the 642 
prevalence and nature of environmental behaviour in farming communities may promote a sense 643 
of group membership and activate accurate descriptive social norms (Cialdini, 2003). Secondly, 644 
appealing to self-identity, such as designing interventions directed stewardship and the unique 645 
contribution of landholders in remote areas, may reach landholders who do not perceive 646 
themselves to be a member of a group of environmentally-minded agriculturalists.   647 
 648 
6. Conclusion  649 
 650 
To improve the condition of river ecosystems stock exclusion behaviours must be maintained 651 
indefinitely (Moore & Rutherfurd, 2017). In the absence of further financial incentives, or the 652 
enforcement of non-compliance, the maintenance of these projects rests on the motivation of 653 
individual landholders. An underlying assumption of using voluntary instruments is that 654 
landholders are motivated by non-monetary incentives, such as pro-environmental social norms 655 
(Danne, 2003). While social norms influence the adoption of agricultural environmental 656 
behaviour, such as stock exclusion behaviour, over time constraints related to drought conditions 657 
may weaken the influence of social norms on the continued maintenance of stock exclusion. This 658 
study examined the relationship between social norms, drought, and the maintenance of stock 659 
exclusion behaviour.  660 
Our results support behavioural theory about the importance of social norms, and suggest 661 
that the distinction between symbolic and instrumental beliefs is relevant for understanding the 662 
maintenance of agricultural environmental behaviour in rural communities. We found that 663 
grazing behaviour is explained by both instrumental injunctive social norms about grazing, and 664 
perceived drought affectedness. Perceived drought affectedness is related to both actual drought 665 
severity, and the amount of income that landholders obtain from farm activities. Interestingly, 666 
landholders do not appear to hold salient descriptive norms about stock exclusion.  667 
Overall, these findings suggest that landholders who perceive themselves to be more 668 
drought affected hold weaker social norms about stock exclusion, and are more likely to continue 669 
grazing stock on riverbanks. In the context of future climate change, voluntary agreements are 670 
likely to be effective for ensuring stock exclusion behaviour is maintained for landholders who 671 
obtain income from multiple sources, and, thus, are less dependent on farm productivity.  672 
We make three observations that are relevant for future environmental policy, and research 673 
about understanding landholder behaviour:  674 
 675 
• Education could be used to promote descriptive social norms about maintenance. Nearly 676 
half the landholders involved in this study continue to maintain stock exclusion. 677 
Information about what others ‘actually’ do could activate descriptive social norms 678 
(Cialdini, 2007) and encourage landholders to maintain stock exclusion behaviours;  679 
• Drought relief packages already include funding for stock management. This could be 680 
targeted towards landholders involved in stock exclusion projects. Subsidizing the cost of 681 
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additional feed could encourage landholders to exclude their stock from riverbanks 682 
during drought events, when riverbank vegetation is most vulnerable (Jansen & 683 
Robertson, 2001); 684 
• The distinction between injunctive and descriptive social norms, and symbolic and 685 
instrumental social norms have important implications for understanding landholder 686 
behaviour and designing interventions to promote environmental projects in rural areas. 687 
Rural research often includes very general measures of social factors, rather than specific 688 
cognitive social constructs. These nuances offer an avenue for future research, and the 689 
design of interventions.  690 
 691 
Understanding the factors that influence landholders’ perceptions of drought affectedness is 692 
essential for designing policies to remove barriers to practice and encourage the voluntary 693 
maintenance of stock exclusion behaviours. Voluntary agreements that offer financial incentives 694 
for landholders to exclude stock from waterways have been effective for promoting the adoption 695 
of stock exclusion behaviours in Victoria. The next challenge is to ensure those behaviours are 696 
maintained indefinitely. This will involve a more nuanced understanding of the relationship 697 
between social norms and environmental behaviour in rural communities, and targeting drought 698 
relief packages to remove barriers to the continued maintenance of stock exclusion.  699 
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Highlights 
The main highlights of the research are as follows:  
• Whether landholders continue to exclude stock from waterways over the long-term is 
influenced by social norms and perceived drought affectedness; 
• Instrumental social norms about drought conditions influence behaviour, while 
symbolic social norms about ideal conditions (good water availability and high farm 
productivity) do not; 
• Perceived drought affectedness is explained by actual drought severity and the 
amount of income landholders obtain from farm activities together; 
• Landholders do not appear to hold salient descriptive norms about how others like 
them behave. 
 
Table 1 
Hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses about stock exclusion & injunctive social norms* 
1 No difference between those landholders that graze and those that do not graze, for the item about 
excluding stock in years of good water availability. 
2 No difference between those landholders that graze and those that do not graze, for the item about 
excluding stock in years of high farm productivity.  
3 Landholders who graze the riverbank would report weaker injunctive norms about excluding stock in years 
of drought.    
4 Landholders who graze the riverbank would report weaker injunctive norms about excluding stock in years 
of low farm productivity. 
5 The injunctive social norm about excluding stock in drought conditions, and perceived drought affectedness 
would predict greater variance in whether or not landholders continue to graze the riverbank than the 
normative belief alone.  
Hypotheses about stock exclusion, drought & income 
6 Landholders who continue to graze the riverbank would report higher drought affectedness than those who 
exclude stock from the riverbank.  
7 There will be a positive relationship between actual drought severity and perceived drought affectedness. 
8 There will be a positive relationship between the percentage of overall income obtained from farm 
activities and perceived drought affectedness 
9 Landholders in CMA C would report higher drought affectedness than landholders in CMA A and CMA B. 
10 Drought severity and the percentage of overall income obtained from farm activities would predict greater 
variance in perceived drought affectedness than either variable individually. 
*Hypothesis 1 and 2 related to symbolic injunctive social norms. Hypothesis 3 and 4 relate to instrumental 
injunctive social norms. 
 
 
Table 2 
Symbolic and instrumental injunctive norm survey items 
 
Type Item 
Symbolic Landholders should be prepared to exclude stock from the fenced frontage only in 
years of good water availability.  
Symbolic Landholders should be prepared to exclude stock from the fenced frontage only in 
years of high farm productivity. 
Instrumental Landholders should be prepared to exclude stock from the fenced frontage even in 
years of drought. 
Instrumental Landholders should be prepared to exclude stock from the fenced frontage even in 
years of low farm productivity. 
 
Table 3 
Correlations between injunctive norms. 
 
 N Mean SD 1 2 3 4 
1.Good water availability 92 3.68 2.29 - .09    .82**   .16 
2.Drought conditions 91 4.36 2.33  - .08  .72** 
3.High farm prod 91 3.73 2.31   -    .20 
4.Low farm prod 91 4.58 2.25    - 
     **p < .01 
 
Table 4 
Correlations between perceived drought affectedness, and income.  
 
 N Mean SD 1 2 
1.Drought affected 90 5.12 2.071 - .45** 
2.Farm income % 87 50.58 41.406  - 
**p < .01 
 
Table 5 
Results of ANOVA for the difference between CMA A, CMA B, and CMA C for:  the 
percentage income from on-farm activities, the drought severity ratio, and the coefficient of 
variance.   
 DF SS MS F P 
% income 2 6439.97 3219.99 1.91 .15 
Drought severity ratio 2 .03 .01 46.93 .00 
Coefficient of 
variance 
2 .04 .02 31.07 .00 
      *DF = degrees freedom, SS = sum of squares, MS = mean square, F = F-statistic,  
P = P-value 
 
Table 6 
 T-test results for Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6. 
 
Hypothesis  N Mean SD t-cal df p 
 
1 
 
Graze 51 3.53 2.23 -.711 89 .48 
Exclude 40 3.88 2.39 
 
2 
 
Graze 51 3.35 2.22 -1.76 89 .08 
Exclude 40 4.20 2.37 
 
3 
 
Graze 51 3.73 2.32 -3.09 89 .00 
Exclude 40 5.18 2.11 
 
4 
 
Graze 51 4.02 2.41 -2.89 89 .00 
Exclude 40 5.30 1.81 
 
6 
 
Graze 52 5.54 1.90 2.28 88 .03 
Exclude 38 4.55 2.18 
 
Table 7 
 Results of the stepwise multiple regression for whether or not landholders graze: the 
instrumental injunctive norm about drought conditions and perceived drought affectedness. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Instrumental injunctive norm .07 .02 .32 .07 .02 .32 
Drought affectedness    -.05 .02 -.22 
 
Table 8  
Results of the stepwise multiple regression for perceived drought affectedness: the percentage 
of income obtained from farming businesses and drought severity.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Percentage of income .02 .00 .48 .02 .00 .42 
Drought severity    29.87 11.89 .26 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Multiple regression model for: the variance of grazing behaviour explained by the 
instrumental social norm about drought and perceived drought affectedness; and the variance 
of perceived drought affectedness explained by drought severity and the percentage of overall 
income obtained from farm businesses.  
 
